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A STUDY OF AMBIGUITY: DOES 
ILLINOIS LAW PERMIT INSURERS TO 
SUBMIT EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO 
RESOLVE INSURANCE POLICY 
AMBIGUITIES? 
Stanley C. Nardoni* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
nsurance law practitioners often hear that all ambiguities in 
insurance policies are resolved in favor of insureds.  It has been 
said that “[t]he words, ‘the contract is to be construed against the 
insurer’ comprise the most familiar expression in the reports of 
insurance cases.”1 Surprisingly, what this insurance ambiguity 
rule means for Illinois policyholders is itself ambiguous. Illinois 
appellate court opinions conflict on whether a court confronted 
with ambiguous policy terms must interpret the policy in favor of 
the insured as a matter of law or first allow the parties, including 
the insurer, a chance to persuade the court of the proper 
interpretation in light of evidence outside of the language of the 
policy. 
This article reviews authority on the insurance ambiguity 
rule under the law of Illinois and elsewhere. It explains that 
although the rule “purports to be an application” of the doctrine 
of contra proferentem, that “general principle of contract law that 
doubtful language is to be interpreted most strongly against the 
party who used it in drafting the contract,”2 the insurance 
                                                          
        * Stanley C. Nardoni is an attorney in the insurance recovery practice 
group of Reed Smith LLP. He is a counsel in the firm and practices in its 
Chicago office. The views expressed in this article are his and not necessarily 
those of Reed Smith LLP, its attorneys or its clients. 
 1  2 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:14 (3d ed. 2011). 
 2  COUCH, supra note 1, § 22:14. 
I 
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ambiguity rule is much stronger. Under general contract law, the 
interpretation of an ambiguous agreement is deemed to present a 
question of fact for resolution with evidence extrinsic to the 
contract, sometimes called parol evidence.3 Contra proferentem is 
employed as a tie-breaker to pick a winner if the extrinsic 
evidence fails to persuade the factfinder of either side’s 
interpretation. The insurance ambiguity rule, on the other hand, 
construes policy ambiguities against the insurer as a matter of 
law in the first instance. 
The article concludes that, although the Illinois Supreme 
Court has not explicitly discussed the varying approaches 
appellate court cases have taken, its holdings have embraced the 
strict insurance ambiguity rule. Courts applying Illinois law 
should take the Illinois Supreme Court’s decisions into account 
when confronting insurer offers of extrinsic evidence. 
II. CONTRA PROFERENTEM UNDER GENERAL 
CONTRACT LAW 
Under general contract law, the interpretation of a written 
contract may present issues of both fact and law, depending on 
the clarity of the agreement. The initial review is conducted by 
the judge hearing the case. If the judge sees no doubt as to the 
contract’s meaning, he or she will interpret it as a matter of law.4  
                                                          
 3  Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vigo Coal Co., Inc., 393 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 
2004) (“evidence outside the contract . . . is, extrinsic evidence”); Duval Motors 
Co. v. Rogers, 73 So. 3d 261, 265 (Fla. App. 2011) (“[E]vidence outside the 
contract language . . . is known as parol evidence.”). 
 4   5-24 ARTHUR L. CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.30 (2012) 
(“If, then, the words of the agreement, whether oral or written, are definite and 
undisputed, and if there is no doubt as to the relevant surrounding 
circumstances, the interpretation of the words is ordinarily held to be a matter 
for the court. . . . The decision as to whether a contract is ambiguous is made 
by the court.”). See also Gryce v. Lavine, 675 A.2d 67, 69 (D.C. 1996) 
(“Whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court.”); 
Richard Feiner & Co. Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 941 N.Y.S.2d 157, 161 
(App. Div. 2012) (“Of course, the matter of whether the contract is ambiguous 
is a question of law for the court.”); Gawryluk v. Poynter, 654 N.W.2d 400, 404 
(N.D. 2002) (“Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the 
court to decide.”); Hawkins v. Greenwood Development Corp., 493 S.E.2d 875, 
879 (S.C. App. 1997) (“It is a question of law for the court whether the 
language of a contract is ambiguous.”); J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 
S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003) (“Deciding whether a contract is ambiguous is a 
question of law for the court.”). 
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If, on the other hand, the judge believes the contract can 
reasonably be understood multiple ways, the agreement will be 
deemed ambiguous, and its interpretation will be treated as a 
question of fact to be decided by a jury or the judge sitting as 
factfinder.5 The factfinder will be allowed to consider extrinsic 
evidence such as communications between the parties that led up 
to the formation of the contract, acts reflecting what the parties 
understood it to mean, and trade usage, all in an effort to decide 
what the parties intended in entering into the agreement.6 
                                                          
 5  CORBIN, supra note 4 § 24.30 (“The weighing of this evidence and the 
determination of the inferences to be drawn—the interpretation—is for the 
jury or other trier of the facts, once the court has determined that ambiguity 
exists. . . . If the only issue presented by the conflicting evidence is the 
interpretation of language, it is a question of fact with which no question of 
law is ‘mixed.’”); Med. Ctr. of Cent. Georgia v. Denon Digital Employee 
Benefit Plan, No. 5:03CV32 (DF), 2005 WL 1630017, at *3 (M.D. Ga. July 11, 
2005) (“[W]here a contract is ambiguous, its interpretation is a matter for the 
jury [i.e. the factfinder]. Since this case was tried without a jury, the Court, in 
this instance, serves as the factfinder”); Bishop Trust Co., Ltd. v. Cent. Union 
Church of Honolulu, 656 P.2d 1353, 1356 (1983) (“Where the language of the 
contract is ambiguous, so that there is some doubt as to the intent of the 
parties, that intent is a question of fact.”); Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, 
Inc., 663 N.W.2d 447, 453-54 (Mich. 2003) (“It is well settled that the meaning 
of an ambiguous contract is a question of fact that must be decided by the 
jury.”); Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Casella Waste Management of Mass., 
Inc., 945 N.E.2d 964, 971 (Mass. App. 2011) (“Once a contractual ambiguity 
emerges, the meaning of the uncertain provision becomes a question of fact for 
the trier.”). 
 6  CORBIN, supra note 4 § 24.30. See also Elda Arnhold and Byzantio, 
L.L.C. v. Ocean Atlantic Woodland Corp., 284 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(“When considering extrinsic evidence, the factfinder should focus, in 
descending order of importance, on: (1) the parties’ negotiations over the 
contract at issue; (2) their course of performance; (3) their prior course of 
dealing; and (4) trade usage in the relevant industry.”); Cent. Heights Imp. Co. 
v. Mem’l Parks, 105 P.2d 596, 605 (Cal. App. 1940) (“The trial court 
admitted . . . parol and extrinsic evidence consisting of conversations between 
the parties and Goodcell occurring before, during, and subsequent to the 
execution of the agreement of April 14th. . . . The evidence was admissible . . . 
for the purpose of aiding the court in ascertaining the true intent and meaning 
of the language used there.”); Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Casella Waste 
Mgmt. of Mass., Inc., 945 N.E.2d 964, 971 (Mass. App. 2011) (“Once a 
contractual ambiguity emerges [. . . [t]he fact finder may then consult extrinsic 
evidence including the circumstances of the formation of the agreement and 
the intentions and objectives of the parties.”); L.L.C. v. Ream, 933 N.E.2d 819, 
824 (Ohio App. 2010) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence may include (1) the circumstances 
surrounding the parties at the time the contract was made, (2) the objectives 
 
NardoniArticle (Do Not Delete)  5/1/2013  9:01 PM 
2013 Insurance Policy Ambiguities in Illinois 381 
Although general contract law recognizes the doctrine of 
contra proferentem to deal with ambiguities, it is highly 
restricted. The doctrine operates to interpret ambiguities against 
whichever party drafted the agreement, but only where the 
factfinder cannot interpret the agreement after considering the 
extrinsic evidence. As one commentator explains: 
In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a 
promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is 
generally preferred which operates against the party 
who supplies the words or from whom a writing 
otherwise proceeds . . . Where one party chooses the 
terms of a contract, he is likely to provide more carefully 
for the protection of his own interests than for those of 
the other party. He is also more likely . . . to have reason 
to know of uncertainties of meaning. Indeed, he may 
leave meaning deliberately obscure, intending to decide 
at a later date what meaning to assert. In cases of doubt, 
therefore, so long as other factors are not decisive, there 
is substantial reason for preferring the meaning of the 
other party. 
.  .  .  
The “contra proferentem” rule has been described as 
being applicable only as a last resort, when other 
techniques of interpretation and construction have not 
resolved the question of which of two or more possible 
reasonable meanings the court should choose. One court 
wrote that it is “a tie breaker” when there is no other 
sound basis for choosing one contract interpretation 
over another.7 
                                                          
the parties intended to accomplish by entering into the contract, and (3) any 
acts by the parties that demonstrate the construction they gave to their 
agreement.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 7   CORBIN, supra note 4 § 24.27 (2012) (footnotes omitted) (quoting from 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206, § 206 cmt a, and Pitcher v. 
Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 870 F. Supp. 903, 915 (S.D. Ind. 1994), aff’d 93 
F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 1996)).  See also Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc., 
663 N.W.2d 447, 456-57 (Mich. 2003) (“[I]f, after the jury has applied all other 
conventional means of contract interpretation and considered the relevant 
extrinsic evidence, the jury is . . . unable to determine what the parties 
intended, the jury should then construe the ambiguity against the drafter. . . . 
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III. THE INSURANCE “AMBIGUITY RULE” EVOLVED 
FROM CONTRA PROFERENTEM 
Although it evolved from the contract doctrine of contra 
proferentem, the insurance ambiguity rule is significantly 
different in scope. “In contract law, contra proferentem is a 
doctrine to be used as a last resort, as a way of breaking ties, but 
in insurance law, it is used as a primary rule (perhaps even the 
primary rule) of interpretation for insurance policies.”8 A federal 
court applying Delaware law summarized this difference in 
approach as follows: 
Normally, in contract actions, analyzing contract 
disputes is potentially a two step process; first, the court 
determines whether the contractual language is 
ambiguous as a matter of law. If the Court finds as a 
matter of law that a contract is ambiguous, the fact 
finder must then determine which conflicting 
interpretation of the contract reflects the parties’ intent. 
Thus, under usual contract principles, if the Court finds 
ambiguity in a contract provision, the ambiguity raises 
an issue of fact which must be resolved at trial, thereby 
precluding summary judgment. 
                                                          
The rule of contra proferentem is a rule of last resort because” it does not 
operate as an aid to identify the intent of the parties but as “‘a rule of legal 
effect’ . . . to ascertain the winner and the loser in connection with a contract 
whose meaning has eluded the jury despite all efforts to apply . . . conventional 
rules of interpretation, including an examination of relevant extrinsic 
evidence.”); Garment v. Zoeller, No. 97CIV7175(LAP), 2001 WL 708895, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2001) (“Contra proferentem provides that where extrinsic 
evidence is conclusory or does not shed light upon the intent of the parties, a 
court may construe any ambiguities in a contract against the drafter as a 
matter of law.  However, as in the present case, ‘where the relevant extrinsic 
evidence offered “raises a question of credibility or presents a choice among 
reasonable inferences” the construction of the ambiguous terms of the contract 
is a question of fact which precludes the application of the contra proferentem 
rule.’”), aff’d, 35 Fed. Appx. 22 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting from Morgan Stanley 
Group, Inc. v. New England Ins. Co., 36 F. Supp. 2d 605, 609 (S.D.N.Y.1999), 
and Alfin, Inc. v. Pacific Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 115, 199 (S.D.N.Y.1990)). 
 8  1 JEFFREY E. THOMAS AND FRANCIS J. MOOTZ, III, NEW APPLEMAN 
ON INSURANCE LAW § 5.02 (Library ed. 2009) (footnote omitted). See also Scott 
G. Johnson, Resolving Ambiguities in Insurance Policy Language, 33 WTR 
Brief 33, 33 (2004) [hereinafter Johnson] (The ambiguity rule is “used as an 
interpretive rule of first resort in insurance contract disputes”). 
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In the insurance context, however, Delaware courts 
have formulated special rules of contract construction 
which differ from those applied to most other contracts. 
If there is any ambiguity in the policy, it must be 
resolved in favor of the insured and against the insurer 
that drafted the policy. When presented squarely with 
ambiguous insurance provisions at summary judgment, 
Delaware courts have adhered to this rule of contra 
proferentem, consistently construing ambiguities in 
favor of the insured as a matter of law.9 
The evolution from contra proferentem to the insurance 
ambiguity rule accompanied the standardization of insurance 
policies. According to one review of the relevant history: 
Insurance contracts used to be construed much as other 
business contracts, but this changed when insurance 
policies became mass-marketed. Unlike a negotiated 
business contract, these insurance policies used 
standardized language drafted by the insurer and 
effectively became “contracts of adhesion.”  
Policyholders typically had no bargaining power and no 
effective means of changing the terms of the insurance 
contract. The courts’ logical reaction to this was to place 
the onus of ambiguous terms on the insurers, because 
they had the better bargaining position and were in a 
better position to avoid the ambiguity.10 
Insurance coverage disputes became particularly 
distinguished from all other contract cases as the market for 
homeowner’s fire insurance grew and disputes over the scope of 
that coverage increased.11 “Since fire insurance policies were most 
often drafted by over-bearing insurance companies, courts began 
to feel justified in applying contra proferentem against the 
insurers without first exhausting all other interpretive tools.”12  
The rationale was then extended to other types of insurance. By 
“the time insurance law was recognized as sufficiently distinct 
                                                          
 9  Oglesby v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 877 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D. Del. 1994) 
(citations omitted). 
 10  Johnson, supra note 8, at 33. 
 11  David S. Miller, Note: Insurance as Contract: The Argument for 
Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1850 (1988). 
 12  Id. at 1852. 
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from contract law to warrant its own treatise” in the nineteenth 
century, “contra proferentem had become known as the 
‘ambiguity rule.’”13 
Today, states differ on how forcefully they apply contra 
proferentem in the insurance context. Many states have chosen to 
adhere to the general contract law approach, viewing the 
interpretation of ambiguous insurance policies as a question of 
fact,14 with contra proferentem retained as a last resort where 
considering extrinsic evidence failed to determine party intent.15  
                                                          
 13  Id. 
 14  See e.g., Hancock v. N.Y.York Life Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 1131, 1135 n.8 
(11th Cir. 1990) (stating that under Alabama law, “[i]f an ambiguous and 
unclear policy . . . can be construed only with the aid of evidence aliunde or 
facts in pais, it is the province of the jury to ascertain those facts and draw 
inferences therefrom.”); Western Line Consol. School Dist. v. Continental Cas. 
Co., 632 F. Supp. 295, 301 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (“Once an ambiguity is 
determined by the court to exist, the question of its meaning is one for the trier 
of fact.”); E & S Facilities, Inc. v. Precision Chipper Corp., 565 So. 2d 54, 59 
(Ala. 1990) (“As we have stated, the policy was ambiguous and those 
ambiguities could be resolved only through evidence and facts outside the 
document itself. . . . It was for the jury to examine the testimony of the parties 
involved and to determine exactly what the parties intended.”); Elam v. First 
Unum Life Ins. Co., 57 S.W.3d 165, 297 (Ark. 2001) (“Where . . . parol evidence 
has been admitted to explain the meaning of the language, the determination 
becomes one of fact for the jury to determine.”); New York v. Home Indem. 
Co., 486 N.E.2d 827, 829 (N.Y. 1985) (“If . . . the language in the insurance 
contract is ambiguous . . . the parties may submit extrinsic evidence as an aid 
in construction, and the resolution of the ambiguity is for the trier of fact.”); 
Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Wallis, 613 P.2d 36, 41 (Or. 1980) (“This court has 
previously held that when the terms of an insurance policy are ambiguous, the 
intention of the parties is a question of fact which should be submitted to and 
decided by the jury as trier of the facts.”). 
 15  See e.g., Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 617, 619 (Md. 1995) 
(“Maryland does not follow the rule, adopted in many jurisdictions, that an 
insurance policy is to be construed most strongly against the insurer.” 
Nevertheless, “if no extrinsic or parol evidence is introduced, or if the 
ambiguity remains after consideration of the extrinsic or parol evidence that is 
introduced, it will be construed against the insurer as the drafter of the 
instrument.”) (quoting Cheney v. Bell National Life, 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Md. 
1989)) (citations omitted); Home Indem. Co., 486 N.E.2d at 829  (“Generally, 
the courts bear the responsibility of determining the rights or obligations of 
parties under insurance contracts based on the specific language of the policies.  
If, however, the language in the insurance contract is ambiguous and 
susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, the parties may submit extrinsic 
evidence as an aid in construction, and the resolution of the ambiguity is for 
the trier of fact. On the other hand, if the tendered extrinsic evidence is itself 
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Still others hold to the strict version of the insurance ambiguity 
rule, thereby automatically interpreting ambiguities against the 
insurer.16 
IV. AMBIGUITY IN ILLINOIS 
Outside of the insurance context, at least, Illinois courts 
clearly apply the tie-breaker approach to resolving contractual 
ambiguities. In Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Whitlock,17 in 
reviewing a summary judgment that interpreted a contractual 
release, the Illinois Supreme Court held: 
A release is a contract, and therefore is governed by 
contract law. The intention of the parties to contract 
must be determined from the instrument itself, and 
construction of the instrument where no ambiguity 
exists is a matter of law. A contract will be considered 
                                                          
conclusory and will not resolve the equivocality of the language of the 
contract, the issue remains a question of law for the court. Under those 
circumstances, the ambiguity must be resolved against the insurer which 
drafted the contract.”) (citations omitted). 
 16  “Jurisdictions that use modern contra proferentem to automatically 
construe policy ambiguities in favor of coverage include New Jersey, Indiana 
(at least as to patent ambiguities), and Texas.” 1 DAVID L. LEITNER, REGAN 
W. SIMPSON & JOHN M. BJORKMAN, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE 
COVERAGE LITIGATION § 1:11 (2012) (footnotes omitted).  See e.g., Carrizales 
v. State Farm Lloyds, 518 F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying Texas law) 
(“Ambiguities in insurance contracts giving rise to two reasonable 
interpretations, one providing and the other denying coverage, are read contra 
proferentem and in favor of the insured. . . . Ambiguity is a question of law for 
the court.”); Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 107 F.3d 451, 
457 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Under Indiana law, when an ambiguity is patent, 
meaning it arises from within the document itself and cannot be resolved by 
reference to the document, the court may not consider extrinsic evidence in 
resolving the ambiguity.”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fermahin, 836 
P.2d 1074, 1077 (Haw. 1992) (“Because insurance contracts are contracts of 
adhesion, they must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and all 
ambiguities are resolved against the insurer.”); Adams Golf, Inc. v. T & F, 
LLC, No. 07 L 010766, 2011 WL 6933718 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill.)(applying 
Texas law) (“The Court finds that . . . the language in the notice provision is 
ambiguous.  Based on the arguments, evidence and the Texas Supreme Court 
cases . . . the language in the contract must be strictly interpreted against the 
insurer. The Court cannot look to extrinsic evidence where the language is 
ambiguous.”). 
 17  Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Whitlock, 581 N.E.2d 664 (Ill. 1991). 
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ambiguous if it is capable of being understood in more 
sense than one. Where a court determines that a 
contract is ambiguous, its construction is then a 
question of fact, and parol evidence is admissible to 
explain and ascertain what the parties intended.18 
The supreme court decided that the release was 
ambiguous in failing to make clear whether it extended to one or 
two loans. In light of that ambiguity, the court reversed the 
summary judgment that had been entered against the bank and 
remanded for interpretation as a matter of fact.19 Without 
suggesting that the release should be construed against its drafter, 
the court held: 
[W]e conclude that the parties’ intent must be 
determined from an examination of extrinsic evidence 
by the trier of fact. 
In granting a motion for summary judgment it is 
improper for the court to speculate in order to determine 
the parties’ intent, as the courts below have done. 
Caution must be exercised in granting summary 
judgment so as not to preempt the right of a party to 
present the factual basis of his case to the fact finder.20 
In line with this reasoning, Illinois courts have consistently 
held that where terms of a contract are ambiguous, extrinsic 
evidence is admissible to determine party intent as a question of 
fact.21 Intent will then be decided by a jury or a judge sitting as 
                                                          
 18  Id. at 667 (citations omitted). 
 19  Id. at 665-67. 
 20  Id. at 667. 
 21  See, e.g., Highland Supply Corp. v. Illinois Power Co., 973 N.E.2d 551, 
558 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“In construing a contract, the court’s primary focus is 
to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties. If no ambiguity exists in 
a contract, its construction is a question of law. However, “[w]here a court 
determines that a contract is ambiguous, its construction is then a question of 
fact, and parol evidence is admissible to explain and ascertain what the parties 
intended.”) (citation omitted); Bradley Real Estate Trust v. Dolan Assocs. Ltd., 
640 N.E.2d 9, 11-12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“If the language is ambiguous, 
extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine the parties’ intent and the 
interpretation of the language is a question of fact.”); see also Air Safety, Inc. v. 
Teachers Realty Corp., 706 N.E.2d 882, 884 (Ill. 1999) (“If . . . the trial court 
finds that the language of the contract is susceptible to more than one 
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factfinder.22 A judge’s interpretation as factfinder will be 
reviewed on a manifest weight of the evidence standard rather 
than the de novo standard applicable to interpreting 
unambiguous contracts.23 Contra proferentem is a last resort if 
                                                          
meaning, then an ambiguity is present. Only then may parol evidence be 
admitted to aid the trier of fact in resolving the ambiguity.”) Hubbard Street 
Lofts LLC v. Inland Bank, 963 N.E.2d 262, 317-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“It is 
well established that if a contract is ambiguous, it presents a question of fact 
and cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss.”); Quake Const., Inc. v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990, 994 (Ill. 1990) (“If the language of an 
alleged contract is ambiguous regarding the parties’ intent, the interpretation 
of the language is a question of fact which a circuit court cannot properly 
determine on a motion to dismiss.”); Chicago Inv. Corp. v. Dolins, 418 N.E.2d 
59, 62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“If the court should find that the document’s 
language is ambiguous, and thus that construction of its meaning is a question 
of fact, it is improper to utilize a section 45 motion [to dismiss] to resolve the 
matter.”) (citation omitted). 
 22   See, e.g., Nat’l Tea Co. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 456 N.E.2d 
206, 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (“Thus, only if the contract is ambiguous and the 
extrinsic facts necessary to determine the parties’ interpretation thereof are in 
controversy should the question of interpretation be left to a jury.”) (citation 
omitted); Nerone v. Boehler, 340 N.E.2d 534, 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (“When 
the court has determined that an ambiguity exists in the contract, evidence of 
prior and contemporaneous transactions and other extrinsic facts may be 
introduced by the parties and considered by the court in ascertaining the true 
meaning of the contract. . . . [I]f the extrinsic facts and circumstances are 
controverted or if the meaning of the contract is uncertain in light of the 
extrinsic evidence, then the intent of the parties to the contract must be 
determined as a question of fact by the jury or by the court in a trial without a 
jury.”) (citations omitted); Vole, Inc. v. Georgacopolous, 538 N.E.2d 205, 211 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“Whereas in the instant case, the construction to be placed 
on an agreement is dependent not only upon the meaning of the words 
employed, but also upon extrinsic facts and circumstances, and upon the 
construction which the parties themselves have placed upon the agreement, 
and as these facts are controverted, any inferences to be drawn are for the trier 
of fact.”); see also Bank of Ravenswood v. Polan, 628 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1993) (“Extrinsic evidence may be introduced to show the intent of 
the parties and resolve an ambiguity in a contract.  If the intent of the parties 
can be determined from facts not in dispute, then the meaning of the contract 
can be determined by the court as a matter of law.  But if the ambiguity can 
only be resolved by resort to facts in dispute, then the contract must be 
construed by the trier of fact.”) (citations omitted). 
 23   See, e.g., InsureOne Indep. Ins. Agency, LLC v. Hallberg, 2012 IL App 
(1st) 092385 ¶ 101 (“A trial court interprets the meaning of clear and 
unambiguous contract terms as a matter of law, and its interpretation is 
subject to de novo review.”); Lease Mgmt. Equip. Corp. v. DFO P’ship, 910 
N.E.2d 709, 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (“Where the language of a contract is clear 
 
Nardoni Article (Do Not Delete) 5/1/2013  9:01 PM 
388 Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 25:4 
the factfinder cannot decide on an interpretation.24 
In the insurance context, on the other hand, although they 
generally say that insurance policies are controlled by the same 
rules of construction as other contracts, Illinois courts have 
spoken of contra proferentem more forcefully. In International 
Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., for 
example, the Illinois Appellate Court stated: 
Contracts of insurance are subject to the same rules of 
construction applicable to other types of contracts. The 
paramount objective is to give effect to the intent of the 
parties as expressed by the terms of the agreement. If 
the language of the policy is ambiguous or otherwise 
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, 
it will be construed in favor of the insured, under the 
doctrine of contra proferentem requiring that 
ambiguities be strictly construed against the drafter of 
the instrument.25 
Despite the apparent strength of this statement, Illinois 
appellate court decisions have conflicted on when contra 
                                                          
and unambiguous, construction of the contract is a matter of law subject to de 
novo review.”); Bunge Corp. v. N. Trust Co., 623 N.E.2d 785, 791 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1993) (“If the terms of an alleged contract are ambiguous or are capable of 
more than one interpretation, parol evidence is admissible to ascertain the 
parties’ intent. . . . Factual determinations regarding the meaning of contract 
language should not be overturned unless they are contrary to the manifest 
weight of the evidence.”). 
 24  See, e.g., William Blair & Co., LLC v. FI Liquidation Corp., 830 
N.E.2d 760, 777-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“Moreover, Spectra correctly points 
out that contra proferentem is a secondary rule of interpretation that should be 
invoked only after ‘ordinary interpretive guides have been exhausted.’  
Thus, . . . Blair’s invocation of contra proferentem is, at best, premature 
because as this case was decided by the circuit court on summary judgment, 
there has not yet been any attempt to resolve the ambiguity through the 
‘ordinary interpretive guides’—namely, a consideration of the extrinsic 
evidence.”) (citations omitted); City of Chicago v. Dickey, 497 N.E.2d 390, 393-
94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (“[T]he circuit court explicitly found that the instrument 
was ambiguous on the question of the parties’ intent.  This finding necessitated 
resort, not to the doctrine of contra proferentem or the summary judgment 
mechanism, but to an evidentiary hearing on the parties’ intent. . . . [T]he court 
erred in applying the doctrine without first permitting the parties an 
opportunity to present extrinsic evidence.”). 
 25  International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 
522 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
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proferentem applies in the insurance context. While cases 
favoring either the tie-breaker or the strict ambiguity rule exist, 
the Illinois Supreme Court’s decisions indicate that the latter rule 
should be followed in insurance cases. 
A. Some Appellate Opinions Apply The General Contract 
Approach In Insurance Cases 
An Illinois appellate court applied the general contract 
law approach to an insurance case in LaSalle Nat’l Insurance Co. 
v. Executive Auto Leasing Co.26 There, the parties disputed the 
interpretation of the term “gross receipts” in an insurance policy’s 
retrospective premium endorsement. The endorsement did not 
expressly state what the parties meant by the term, and the 
contractual definition was “susceptible of either LaSalle’s or 
Executive’s construction.”27 The agreement was thus ambiguous 
because “the words used by the parties are fairly susceptible of 
being understood in more than one sense.”28 Citing general 
contract cases rather than insurance decisions, the court stated: 
In the construction of a contract the determining factor 
is the intention of the parties. If possible, the intention 
must be ascertained from the language employed in the 
contract but if this is impossible, the language may be 
explained by extrinsic evidence so that the true 
intention of the parties may be learned. 
The present policy requires extrinsic evidence to ascertain 
the intent of the parties at the time they entered into it. 
Admissible facts and circumstances surrounding the making of 
the contract, the interpretation placed upon it by the parties 
contemporaneously with its making or by their performance 
under its terms, acts by one party which may have indicated 
acceptance of the other’s interpretation, may aid the court or jury 
in reaching the correct construction. The ambiguity of the policy 
created a genuine issue of material fact.29 
The trial court had entered summary judgment for the 
insurer, but the appellate court agreed with Executive Auto 
                                                          
 26  LaSalle Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Executive Auto Leasing Co., 257 N.E.2d 508 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1970). 
 27  Id. at 512. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. at 512-13 (citations omitted). 
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Leasing Co.’s contention that summary judgment was improper 
in the circumstances, and the case had to be remanded for a trial, 
instead.30 
Judge Richard A. Posner of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that the LaSalle 
National case means Illinois follows the tie-breaker approach in 
insurance cases.31 In Harbor Insurance Company v. Continental 
Bank Corporation, which dealt with director and officer liability 
insurance as well as a dispute over the meaning of “indemnity” in 
the bank’s charter, his opinion for the court stated: 
                                                          
 30 LaSalle Nat’l Ins. Co., 257 N.E.2d at 513. Other Illinois Appellate Court 
cases have similarly expressed openness to considering extrinsic evidence to 
resolve policy ambiguities, but most saw no need to do so because they judged 
the policy unambiguous. E.g., Westfield Ins. Co. v. FCL Builders, Inc., 948 
N.E.2d 115, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“We may only consider extrinsic evidence 
outside of the contract if the contract is ambiguous. The policy provision in 
this case is not ambiguous. . .”) (citation omitted); Sharp v. Trans Union 
L.L.C., 845 N.E.2d 719, 726-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (“The court may look to 
extrinsic materials only where the policy’s language is ambiguous. . . . The 
language of exclusion (g) is not ambiguous.”) (citation omitted); CNA Cas. v. 
E.C. Fackler, Inc., 836 N.E.2d 732, 736 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“[I]f the court finds 
that the language of the Policy is susceptible to more than one meaning . . . we 
may consider parol evidence to resolve the ambiguity . . . [but] the plain 
language of the insolvency exclusion at issue” bars coverage if certain facts 
occur) (citation omitted); Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 812 N.E.2d 741, 749 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2004) (“Because we conclude that the meaning of the policy can be 
determined on the face of the policy, it is unnecessary to consider the extrinsic 
documents . . .”); Pre-Fab Transit Co. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 600 
N.E.2d 866, 869, 871 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“If the terms of an alleged contract 
are ambiguous or capable of more than one interpretation, parol evidence is 
admissible to ascertain the parties’ intent. . . . We conclude that the 
retrospective premium endorsement in the present case is unambiguous . . .”) 
(citation omitted); Seeburg Corp. v. United Founders Life Ins. Co., 403 N.E.2d 
503, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (“[I]f the terms are ambiguous and uncertain, the 
court should consider extrinsic matters,” though the policy was “clear and 
unambiguous”). At least one case concluded that extrinsic evidence supported 
the insurer’s reading of the policy but ruled in favor of coverage anyway 
because “the principles of insurance contract construction” required it to 
interpret an ambiguous coverage rejection form against the insurer. Carroll 
Tiling Serv. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Ill., 796 N.E.2d 702, 708-10  (Ill. App. Ct. 
2003). Another court recited that extrinsic evidence is permissible to resolve 
ambiguities but relied on case law to construe the policy. Where it found 
endorsement language “[a]t best” ambiguous, it held any such “ambiguity must 
be resolved . . . in favor of coverage.”  University of Ill. v. Continental Cas. 
Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1345-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
 31  Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 366 (7th Cir. 1990). 
NardoniArticle (Do Not Delete)  5/1/2013  9:01 PM 
2013 Insurance Policy Ambiguities in Illinois 391 
The charter is ambiguous, and therefore testimony, 
including expert testimony-including in suitable cases 
testimony by a lawyer-was a permissible aid to 
interpretation. This is black-letter law, and neither side 
questions it. And yet it might seem to jostle with the 
familiar principle of interpretation, as well established 
in Illinois as anywhere, that ambiguities in insurance 
contracts are to be resolved against the insurance 
company. Given this rule-if there is an ambiguity, the 
insured wins-why would there ever be an occasion for 
attempting to resolve an ambiguity in an insurance 
contract by evidence? Yet that is exactly what was done 
in LaSalle National Ins. Co. v. Executive Auto Leasing 
Co. Reconciliation is possible along the following lines. 
If an insurance contract is ambiguous either party 
should be allowed to introduce evidence to 
disambiguate it. But if, all such evidence having been 
considered, the meaning of the contract is still uncertain, 
then the insured wins. In other words, the interpretive 
principle (favor the insured) is merely a tie-breaker.32 
In line with this view, a federal district court judge 
recently looked to extrinsic evidence to interpret an exclusion she 
deemed ambiguous.33 The extrinsic evidence included expert 
testimony offered by the insured on the meaning of a policy 
phrase that was a “term of art.”34 The judge issued summary 
                                                          
 32  Id. at 365-6 (citations omitted). Judge Posner repeated his 
understanding of the rule in opinions for the court in Stone Container v. 
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 165 F.3d 1157, 1161 (7th Cir. 
1999) (“[T]he rule that ambiguities in insurance contracts are to be resolved in 
favor of the insured comes into play only after the insurance company has had 
an opportunity to present evidence designed to dispel the ambiguity.”), and 
Rhone-Poulenc Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 71 F.3d 1299, 1305 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(“[A]lthough ambiguities in insurance contracts are to be resolved against the 
insurer, this principle comes into play only after reasonable efforts at 
interpretation have failed, including the taking of evidence concerning the 
drafting or negotiation of the contract.”). 
 33  Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Merge Healthcare Solutions, Inc., No. 11 C 
3844, 2012 WL 1532266, *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2012).  The court cited Illinois 
general contract case law in deciding that “[b]ecause the contract language is 
ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ 
intent.”  Id. (citing Ancraft Prods. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 427 N.E.2d 
585, 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). 
 34  Id. at *3. 
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judgment in favor of the insured based on the insured’s 
interpretation of the term of art and because the insurer 
“present[ed] no evidence supporting its suggested reading of the 
policy.”35 
B. Other Appellate Opinions Employ the Insurance Ambiguity 
Rule 
A contrary approach was taken by another Illinois 
appellate court panel in Aguilar v. Safeway Insurance Co.36 
There, the insureds sued their uninsured motorist carrier claiming 
that their insurance company’s policy required them to file suit if 
they wanted the insurance company to reimburse their costs.37 
They urged that a policy provision saying that a “suit seeking 
recovery” under the uninsured motorist coverage section “must be 
filed within two years of the accident” created an ambiguity in 
the policy.38 They claimed that this language could be read to 
require them to sue uninsured motorists.39 Having done so, they 
claimed they were entitled to reimbursement for their costs of 
bringing that litigation.40 The insurer, on the other hand, claimed 
the language limited the insureds’ time to sue the insurer not the 
uninsured motorist.41 A trial judge accepted the insurer’s reading 
of the policy on its face and dismissed the insureds’ complaint 
with prejudice for failing to state a cause of action.42    
The appellate court disagreed. Reading the two-year suit 
provision in light of other parts of the policy, it concluded that the 
language was subject to different interpretations.43 Because it was 
“ambiguous as a matter of law,” the court interpreted the 
language in favor of the insured.44 Remanding with directions to 
reinstate the complaint, it explained: 
In light of those ambiguities, we are compelled to 
construe the policy as against the defendant-drafter of 
                                                          
 35  Id. 
 36  Aguilar v. Safeway Ins. Co., 157 Ill.App.3d 877, 1135 (Ill.App. 1987). 
 37  Id.  
 38  Id. at 1136. 
 39  Id. at 1135. 
 40  Id. at 1136. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. at 1135. 
 43  Id. at 1137. 
 44  Id. 
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the policy. Such construction leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that defendant, by the terms of the policy as 
alleged in the complaint, required plaintiffs to file suit 
against the uninsured motorists. As further alleged in 
the complaint, by requiring the initiation of those law 
suits, defendant has become obligated to reimburse 
plaintiffs for court costs associated with those cases.45 
One member of the panel dissented. He agreed that the 
policy language was ambiguous, but he claimed it was too soon to 
resolve that ambiguity against the insurer. The dissenter 
maintained: 
Because . . . an appeal from a dismissal for failure to 
state a cause of action preserves for review only the 
legal sufficiency of the complaint and since the 
resolution of an ambiguity presents a factual questions, 
the majority having found the language ambiguous 
should have vacated the judgment and remanded for 
further proceedings which would include the resolution 
of the ambiguity in which parol evidence would be 
admissible to explain and ascertain the meaning of the 
language in question…. However, instead of vacatur 
and remandment as suggested above, the majority has 
resolved the ambiguity, a factual determination, in 
favor of plaintiffs, and in so doing has improperly 
predetermined the liability of the defendant without 
giving it the opportunity to negate allegations in the 
complaint or to assert possible policy defenses.46 
Read in light of the dissent, the Aguilar case presents an 
approach to resolving ambiguity directly opposite from the one 
taken in in LaSalle National. 
A longtime practitioner of Illinois insurance law recently 
described that strict ambiguity rule as the dominant one in 
Illinois. Writing in the Illinois Bar Journal, Jack Leyhane, a 
Chicago attorney with decades of experience in the representation 
of insurance carriers and others in significant coverage 
litigation,47 observed: 
                                                          
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. at 1138 (Sullivan, J. dissenting). 
 47  E.g., John Burns Const. Co. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 700 N.E.2d 763 (Ill. 
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Whether a contract is ambiguous is determined as a 
matter of law.  If a contract is found to be ambiguous, 
depending on the type of contract being construed, parol 
evidence may be admissible to ascertain the true intent 
of the contracting parties.  (Although insurance policies 
are ordinarily construed like any other contract, they are 
different from other contracts in this important respect: 
If an insurance contract is determined to be ambiguous, 
it will be strictly construed against the insurer, the 
drafter of the policy.) 
.  .  .  
It has been said that every contract is written for three 
parties: The party of the first part, the party of the 
second part, and the judge or arbitrator who must 
decide which of the other two is in breach. This is of 
particular import in the law of insurance, because if a 
court cannot understand what a policy means in a given 
instance, whether a competing interpretation is offered 
or not, it may well conclude that the provision is 
ambiguous because it is “obscure in meaning through 
indefiniteness of expression.” Because the insurer cannot 
bring in parol evidence in that situation to explain what 
it meant to say, the insurer may be unable, as a matter 
of law, to enforce or rely upon the disputed policy 
provision.48 
C.  The Illinois Supreme Court Applies the Insurance Ambiguity 
Rule 
The Illinois Supreme Court has not expressly stated 
whether insurers are permitted to offer extrinsic evidence to 
interpret ambiguous insurance policies. The closest it seems to 
have come to addressing the point was a footnote rejecting the 
                                                          
App. Ct. 1998), rev’d, 727 N.E.2d 211 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (establishing Illinois’ 
unique “targeted tender” rule); Indiana Ins. Co. v. Liaskos, 697 N.E.2d 398 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1998); Lyon v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 566 N.E.2d 388 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1990); LaSalle Nat. Bank v. Allstate Ins. Co., 519 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1987). 
 48  Jack Leyhane, The Two Faces of Contract Ambiguity Claims, 100 ILL. 
BAR J. 264, 267 (2012) (footnotes omitted) (quoting from Platt v. Gateway 
Intern. Motorsports Corp., 813 N.E.2d 279, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)). 
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insureds’ offer of an insurer document to interpret language the 
court deemed unambiguous in Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co.49 
A study of the way the Illinois Supreme Court has 
resolved insurance policy ambiguities, however, reflects that it 
employs the strict insurance ambiguity rule rather than the 
general contract law approach. That it favors the strict ambiguity 
rule is evidenced by three facts. First, the court has repeatedly 
prescribed the rule for resolving ambiguities without referencing 
any potential for extrinsic evidence. Second, the court identifies 
insurance policy interpretation as exclusively a question of law 
even when ambiguities are involved. Finally, the court has 
resolved ambiguities against insurers on the pleadings pursuant 
to motions that did not allow submission of extrinsic evidence.  
Each of these points is discussed below. 
1. The Court Phrases the Rule Without Suggesting Submission 
of Extrinsic Evidence 
The Illinois Supreme Court summarized the basic rules of 
insurance policy construction in Gillen v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company: 
Our primary objective when construing an insurance 
policy is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of 
                                                          
 49  Avery v. State Farm mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005).  
The supreme court observed that “[a]bsent a finding” that a policy promise 
was “ambiguous, such extrinsic evidence is irrelevant to the meaning of this 
contractual provision. . . . We make no such finding of ambiguity.” Id. at 828 
n.5. It is not clear that the court was saying that extrinsic evidence is 
necessarily proper to interpret insurance policies or that insurers would be 
allowed to present such evidence.  The court cited two prior decisions, but 
neither held extrinsic evidence admissible to resolve policy ambiguities. 
Grzeszczak v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 659 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ill. 1995) 
(refusing insured widow’s attempt to rely on rule of construction known as 
“the premium rule” where the antistacking provisions of underinsured motorist 
coverage were unambiguous); Dempsey v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 88 
N.E.2d 874, 876 (Ill. 1949) (saying merely that policy and its attachments 
“must be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the 
parties have used, and if the language is clear and unambiguous it must be 
taken and understood according to its plain, ordinary and popular sense”). The 
first case actually considered it “well established that if an insurance clause is 
ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the insured.”  Grzeszczak, 659 
N.E.2d at 956. 
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the parties, as expressed in the policy language.  The 
construction we give to an insurance policy should be a 
natural and reasonable one.  Undefined terms will be 
given their plain, ordinary and popular meaning, i.e., 
they will be construed with reference to the average, 
ordinary, normal, reasonable person.  If the policy 
language is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
meaning, it is considered ambiguous and will be 
construed against the insurer. Importantly, a policy 
provision that purports to exclude or limit coverage will 
be read narrowly and will be applied only where its 
terms are clear, definite, and specific.50 
The Illinois Supreme Court has said that it resolves 
ambiguities against insurers “because there is little or no 
bargaining involved in the insurance contracting process, the 
insurer has control in the drafting process, and the policy’s 
overall purpose is to provide coverage to the insured.”51 It has 
also observed that because third-parties injured by insureds must 
rely on the insureds’ policies for compensation, public policy 
warrants interpreting policies in favor of coverage.52 The court 
has firmly rejected the idea that large sophisticated policyholders 
should lack the protection of the insurance ambiguity rule.53 The 
court’s recitation of the rule without reference to extrinsic 
evidence and its reasons for holding to the rule suggest the court 
does not contemplate the admission of extrinsic evidence from 
insurers to reduce the scope of coverage. 
                                                          
 50  Id. at 582 (citation omitted). 
 51  Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 
1217 (Ill. 1992). 
 52  State Security Ins. Co. v. Burgos, 583 N.E.2d 547, 554 (Ill. 1991) (“In the 
context of liability insurance policies, public policy considerations also dictate 
that a liberal construction in favor of coverage be applied as the recovery of an 
injured third party is involved.”). 
 53  Id.; Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d at 1218-19 (“The insurance industry 
is powerful and closely knit. As evidenced by the CGL policies in the instant 
case, most policies are standard-form, are worded very similarly, and are 
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Any insured, whether large and 
sophisticated or not, must enter into a contract with the insurer which is 
written according to the insurer’s pleasure by the insurer. Generally, since little 
or no negotiation occurs in this process, the insurer has total control of the 
terms and the drafting of the contract. This rule of construction recognizes, 
inter alia, these facets of the insurance contracting process.”). 
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2. The Court Views Interpretation as Always a Question of Law 
In contrast with its approach for other types of contracts, 
the Illinois Supreme Court has consistently identified insurance 
policy interpretation as solely a question of law. Although a few 
of its decisions have spoken of that as the rule for “unambiguous” 
policies,54 the typical formulation states that all policy 
interpretation issues are questions of law.55 Even when reviewing 
                                                          
 54  E.g., Roberts v. Northland Ins. Co., 705 N.E.2d 762, 764 (Ill. 1998) 
(“The construction of an unambiguous insurance policy provision is a question 
of law subject to de novo review.”); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Savickas, 739 N.E.2d 445, 448-49 (Ill. 2000) (“The construction of an 
unambiguous insurance policy provision is a question of law, and the policy’s 
terms are to be applied as written unless those terms contravene public 
policy.”). 
 55  E.g., Pekin Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 930 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (Ill. 2010) (“[T]he 
construction of the provisions of an insurance policy is a question of law for 
which our review is de novo.); Schultz v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 930 N.E.2d 
943, 948 (Ill. 2010) (“Construction of the terms of an insurance policy and 
whether the policy comports with statutory requirements are questions of law 
properly decided on a motion for summary judgment.”); Addison Ins. Co. v. 
Fay, 905 N.E.2d 747, 751 (Ill. 2009) (“The construction of a provision of an 
insurance policy is a question of law . . .”); Guillen v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill., 
785 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. 2003) (“The construction of an insurance policy, which is a 
question of law, is also reviewed de novo”); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Eljer Mfg., 
Inc., 757 N.E.2d 481, 491 (Ill. 2001) (“The construction of the provisions of an 
insurance policy is . . . a question of law”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Villicana, 692 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ill. 1998) (“We begin our discussion by 
noting that the construction of an insurance policy is a question of law”); 
American States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ill. 1997) (“Finally, the 
construction of an insurance policy is a question of law subject to de novo 
review.”); Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 655 N.E.2d 
842, 846 (Ill. 1995) (“The construction of an insurance policy and its provisions 
is a question of law.”); Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d at 1204 (“The 
construction of an insurance policy’s provisions is a question of law.”); United 
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Elder, 427 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ill. 1981) (“The sole 
question is whether the Volkswagen was a replacement or an additional 
vehicle as defined in the policy. That question is one of law, to be determined 
by the court.”); Rockford Ins. Co. v. Storig, 24 N.E. 674, 674-75 (Ill. 1890) (“It 
is to be premised that what is meant by the term ‘vacant and unoccupied,’ in a 
policy of insurance, is a question of law, but whether the building was at the 
time of the loss ‘vacant and unoccupied,’ within the meaning of the policy, is a 
question of fact.”); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 92 Ill. 64, 70 (Ill. 1879) (“Now, 
what is meant by the term vacant or unoccupied, in the connection in which it 
occurs in the policy, is a question of law; but whether the house was, at the 
time of the fire, within the meaning of the policy, vacant and unoccupied, was 
a question of fact for the determination of the jury.”). 
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an appellate decision that held an exclusion ambiguous, the 
supreme court stressed that “the construction of an insurance 
policy is a question of law subject to de novo review” and that all 
ambiguous terms “will be construed strictly against the insurer 
who drafted the policy.”56 The court has explicitly held that 
insurance policy interpretation is a matter “for the trial judge and 
not for the jury.”57 
[W]ell settled rules of interpretation or construction 
govern the court when it construes an insurance 
contract . . . [I]f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the 
meaning of the language employed in the contract of 
insurance, and the language is reasonably susceptible of 
two meanings or interpretations, one of which is 
favorable to the insured and the other to the insurance 
company, the interpretation that favors the insured will 
be adopted.58 
In Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,59 the 
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the striking of a jury demand in 
a suit for a declaratory judgment on insurance policies. The court 
saw no place for a jury because the sole purpose of the insurer’s 
complaint and the insured’s counterclaim were to obtain a 
declaration of rights over the construction of the policies. These 
were “questions of law, the determination of which rests 
exclusively with the court,” leaving “no right to a jury trial on 
either the complaint or the counterclaim.”60 
3. The Supreme Court Has Resolved Ambiguities on the 
Pleadings Alone 
Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court has itself resolved 
insurance policy ambiguities without directing submission of 
extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity. One example is 
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust.61 There, 
the court affirmed rulings in a judgment on the pleadings that an 
                                                          
 56  Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 74-75. 
 57  Treolo v. Iroquois Auto Ins. Underwriters, 180 N.E. 575, 576 (Ill. 1932). 
 58  Id. (citation omitted). 
 59  Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 514 N.E.2d 150, 166 (Ill. 1987). 
 60  Id. 
 61  Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 708 N.E.2d 1122 
(Ill. 1999). 
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Arkansas action brought to enter a previously-signed consent 
decree constituted a “suit” within the meaning of Wausau’s 
promise “to defend any suit against the insured.”62 The court 
rejected an appellate court ruling that such an action was 
insufficiently adversarial to qualify as a “suit” under Wausau’s 
policy.63 In refusing Wausau’s narrow interpretation of the term 
“any suit,” the court held: 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Wausau’s interpretation 
of “any suit” is reasonable, at best it would create an 
ambiguity in the policy language. “A policy provision is 
ambiguous only if it is subject to more than one 
reasonable interpretation.” Wausau’s interpretation 
would then compete with the definition of suit, set forth 
above. Where competing reasonable interpretations of a 
policy exist, a court is not permitted to choose which 
interpretation it will follow. Rather, in such 
circumstances, the court must construe the policy in 
favor of the insured and against the insurer that drafted 
the policy. Since Wausau’s interpretation affords less 
coverage to Ehlco, we would be required to reject it. 
Wausau’s argument thus fails in any event.64 
The court would not have said the disputed term could be 
interpreted as a matter of law pursuant to a judgment on the 
pleadings if extrinsic evidence must be considered before 
applying the ambiguity rule. As the Ehlco court recognized, 
judgment on the pleadings is proper only where “the admissions 
in the pleadings disclose that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”65 A judgment on the pleadings cannot issue where the 
pleadings leave open material disputes of fact.66 Illinois courts 
                                                          
 62  Id. at 1129-31. 
 63  Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 687 N.E.2d 82, 
85-89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 708 N.E.2d 1122 (Ill. 
1999). 
 64  Employers Ins., 708 N.E.2d at 1130 (citations omitted). 
 65  Id. at 1129 (quoting 3 R. MICHAEL, ILLINOIS PRACTICE § 27.2, at 494 
(1989)). 
 66  Gillen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 830 N.E.2d 575, 577 (2005) 
(“Judgment on the pleadings is proper where the pleadings disclose no genuine 
issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court will 
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may not even consider extrinsic evidence in deciding whether to 
issue a judgment on the pleadings.67 
The court again took a similar approach in Hoglund v. 
State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co.68 In Hoglund, the court 
considered whether the setoff terms of policies providing 
uninsured motorist coverage allowed the insurer credit for 
payments by another insurer where an accident resulted from 
negligence of insured and uninsured parties and the payment 
from the insured tortfeasor failed to compensate for the insured’s 
full damages. Relying on the policy language, a trial judge 
granted judgment on the pleadings to State Farm. The Illinois 
Supreme Court acknowledged that “a literal interpretation of the 
policy language” allowed such a setoff, but it judged that those 
terms were ambiguous when considered in light of the insured’s 
reasonable expectations, the purpose of uninsured motorist 
coverage, and the facts of the underlying cases.69 That ambiguity 
had to be resolved in favor of the insured as a matter of law. The 
court thus held: 
We have previously noted that the public policy behind 
the uninsured motorist statute is to place the injured 
party in substantially the same position he would be in 
                                                          
consider only those facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, matters 
subject to judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the record.”) (citations 
omitted); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Young, 968 N.E.2d 759, 763 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2012) (“A motion for judgment on the pleadings asserts the allegations in 
the pleadings and the exhibits to the pleadings, which are considered part of 
the pleadings, permit only one disposition as a matter of law.  Judgment on the 
pleadings is proper only if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”) (citations omitted). 
 67  See M.A.K. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.-Luke’s Medical Center, 764 
N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 2001) (“In ruling upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
a court may consider only (1) facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, (2) 
matters subject to judicial notice, and (3) judicial admissions in the record. 
Extrinsic evidence may not be considered.”) (citation omitted); Romano v. 
Village of Glenview, 660 N.E.2d 56, 61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (The motion 
“attacks only defects apparent on the face of the complaint, and extrinsic 
evidence cannot be considered”). 
 68  Hoglund v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 592 N.E.2d 1031 (Ill. 1992). 
 69  Id. at 1035 (The court spoke of those general circumstances as “extrinsic 
evidence” showing the policy was ambiguous, but it did not suggest this 
ambiguity called for extrinsic evidence as to what the policy terms meant to 
resolve the ambiguity. On the contrary, it said that “any ambiguity in an 
insurance policy must be construed in favor of coverage for the insured”). 
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if the uninsured driver had been insured. If the position 
of State Farm were to be adopted, however, this 
purpose would be frustrated. If, for instance, the 
uninsured motorcycle driver had been insured for 
$100,000, Miss Hoglund could have collected that sum 
in full from that driver’s insurer, along with the 
$100,000 she collected from the other insured driver. 
The separate collections of $100,000 from each of the 
two culpable drivers would have fully compensated her 
for her $200,000 in damages. State Farm’s position, 
however, is to insist that it receive a full setoff for the 
payment made on behalf of the insured driver. Such a 
result would violate the public policy behind the 
uninsured motorist statute that the injured party be 
placed in the same position as if the uninsured driver 
had been insured. Additionally, the insurance policies at 
issue were intended to provide coverage for damages 
caused by uninsured motorists. To allow a literal 
interpretation of the policy language would nullify the 
coverage intended by the policies. Further, to endorse 
State Farm’s interpretation of the setoff provision 
would deny the policyholder substantial economic value 
in return for the payment of premiums. That is to say, 
the insured would be denied the very insurance 
protection against uninsured motorists for which he had 
paid premiums.70 
In light of those circumstances, the setoff provision was 
ambiguous, and “[u]nder Illinois law, any ambiguity in an 
insurance policy must be construed in favor of coverage for the 
insured.”71 The court therefore resolved the “ambiguity in these 
setoff provisions in favor of coverage for the plaintiffs.”72 As in 
Ehlco, the court did not view insurance policy ambiguities as 
creating a fact issue. Its approach in Hoglund and Ehlco stands in 
stark contrast to the one it took for the non-insurance contract in 
Farm Credit Bank discussed above, where it held that ambiguity 
mandated resolution by a factfinder.73 
                                                          
 70  Id.  
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. 
 73  See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
A careful analysis of its decisions shows that the Illinois 
Supreme Court employs a strict version of the insurance 
ambiguity rule. That strict version holds that once an ambiguity 
is found in insurance policy language, a court will resolve it in 
favor of the insured without first opening the question for 
submission of extrinsic evidence to demonstrate an interpretation. 
Under that approach, insurance policy interpretation is deemed 
exclusively a question of law without reserving contra 
proferentem as a rule of last resort. The Illinois Supreme Court 
holds: “Where competing reasonable interpretations of a policy 
exist, a court is not permitted to choose which interpretation it 
will follow. Rather, in such circumstances, the court must 
construe the policy in favor of the insured and against the insurer 
that drafted the policy.”74  Courts should not overlook this Illinois 
Supreme Court authority when confronting an insurer’s offers of 
extrinsic evidence to resolve policy ambiguities. 
                                                          
 74  Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 708 N.E.2d 
1122, 1130 (Ill. 1999). 
